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Abstract: This study aims to analyze the simultaneous effect between Financial 
Reporting Aggressiveness and Tax Reporting Aggressiveness. Moreover, this study 
seeks to examine the impact of financial reporting aggressiveness (the level of tax 
reporting aggressiveness had influenced that) on the earnings informativeness. Also, 
this study also aims to investigate the impact of tax reporting aggressiveness (the level 
of financial reporting aggressiveness had influenced that) on the earnings 
informativeness. Using the TSLS method and sample consists of Indonesian listed 
manufacture companies for the period 2013 – 2016, this study found that the financial 
reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness have a simultaneous effect. 
However, this study failed to demonstrate that the simultaneous effect between 
financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness have a significant 
impact on earnings informativeness. There are two contributions expected from this 
study. First, it provides empirical evidence that financial reporting aggressiveness and 
tax reporting aggressiveness have simultaneously effect since this study is the first that 
investigates this area. Second, this research also the first that focused on analyzing 
the earnings informativeness impact of managers' activity in financial reporting and 
tax reporting aggressiveness. 
 
Keywords: Financial reporting aggressiveness, tax reporting aggressiveness, earnings 
informativeness. 
 
Intisari: Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis pengaruh simultan antara 
Financial Reporting Agressiveness dan Tax Reporting Agressiveness. Lebih lanjut, 
penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji dampak agresivitas pelaporan keuangan (yang 
telah dipengaruhi oleh tingkat agresivitas pelaporan pajak) pada daya informasi laba. 
Selain itu, penelitian ini juga bertujuan untuk menyelidiki dampak agresivitas 
pelaporan pajak (yang telah dipengaruhi oleh tingkat agresivitas pelaporan
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – Jan, Vol. 22 , No.1 , 2019 
2 
 
 keuangan) pada daya informasi laba. Dengan menggunakan metode TSLS dan 
sampel yang terdiri dari perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek 
Indonesia untuk periode 2013 - 2016, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa agresivitas 
pelaporan keuangan dan pelaporan pajak agresivitas memiliki efek simultan. Namun, 
penelitian ini gagal menunjukkan bahwa efek simultan antara agresivitas pelaporan 
keuangan dan agresivitas pelaporan pajak memiliki dampak yang signifikan terhadap 
daya informasi laba. Ada dua kontribusi yang diharapkan dari penelitian ini, 
pertama, memberikan bukti empiris bahwa agresivitas pelaporan keuangan dan 
agresivitas pelaporan pajak memiliki efek simultan, karena penelitian ini adalah yang 
pertama yang menyelidiki bidang ini. Kedua, penelitian ini juga yang pertama yang 
berfokus pada analisis dampak daya informasi laba atas aktivitas manajer dalam 
pelaporan keuangan dan pelaporan pajak yang agresif. 
 
Kata Kunci: Agresivitas pelaporan keuangan, agresivitas pelaporan pajak, daya 
informasi laba. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Management has a responsibility to take various policies and activities to 
organize the company, to doing so, managers focus on maximizing the accounting 
income as well as to minimize the taxable income through earnings management and 
tax planning activities. Frank et al. (2009) explained that tax reporting aggressiveness 
is an attempt to decrease profits with tax planning either by legal means (not violating 
the law) or by illegal means (tax evasion). In general, companies assume that taxes are 
a burden that can reduce the company's wealth; this makes the managers attempt to 
minimize the income tax through tax management activities. However, the tax 
management activities will lead to the minimum reported income which is unfavorable 
to the shareholders, investors, and creditors. Therefore, managers commonly trade off 
with earning management activities. Frank et al. (2009) had found that there is a 
tradeoff on the aggressiveness of managers in financial reporting for tax purposes with 
earnings management activities to report earnings to shareholders, investors, and 
creditors. 
Tax planning activities by choosing accounting policies that have an impact on 
minimizing taxable income (fiscal profit), as well as earnings management activities 
that aim to maximize net income (accounting profit), both reflected in earnings 
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reports. The reported earnings as a result of the earnings and tax planning activities 
will eventually cause the information content to be less relevant so that it can allegedly 
lead to a decrease in the earnings informativeness. Therefore, this can mislead the 
investors or shareholders if they use the less relevant earnings report for the basis of 
decision making. On this basis, it is necessary to research that the aggressiveness of 
financial statements and the aggressiveness of tax reports can affect earnings 
information. In Indonesia, the problem with the earnings informativeness remain 
occurs because of the lack of credibility of information reported by the company. This 
is important to gain the investors' trust related to support their decision making. 
Previous studies have examined the impact of the conformity of accounting 
reports with tax rules (book-tax conformity) on the earnings informativeness. 
According to Hanlon et al. (2008), the earnings informativeness can be reflected in the 
Book Tax Different (BTD) value because if accounting standards and tax regulations 
are more conform (higher book-tax conformity) will lead to fewer earnings 
informativeness. Moreover, Hanlon et al. (2008) documented that companies with 
large BTD (LBTD) are associated with low earnings informativeness levels as the 
components of LBTD are indicators of the intensity of earnings management. From 
that empirical evidence, it can be concluded that financial statements, taxable income, 
and earnings information are interconnected. However, no study focuses on the 
aggressiveness of managers in reporting, both accounting and tax reports, associated 
with information earnings. 
Previous studies on the effect of the aggressiveness of financial statements on the 
aggressiveness of tax reports show inconsistent results, namely Frank et al. (2009) and 
Kamila and Martani (2014) found that financial reporting aggressiveness has a 
positive effect on tax reporting aggressiveness. However, Hanna and Haryanto (2016) 
show that financial reporting aggressiveness does not affect tax reporting 
aggressiveness. The inconsistency of the empirical evidence (especially in the context 
of Indonesia), this study will reexamine the effect of financial reporting 
aggressiveness on tax reporting aggressiveness. In contrast to the research of Frank et 
al. (2009); Kamila and Martani (2014); and Hanna and Haryanto (2016), this study 
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will examine the simultaneous (reciprocal) influence between financial reporting 
aggressiveness and tax reporting, and furthermore, this study will investigate the 
impact on the earnings informativeness. 
In 2012 a total of 4000 foreign investment companies reported losses in their 
financial statements for seven consecutive years and the majority were manufacturing 
companies (Directorate General of Taxes, 2013). The consequence of the loss reported 
in the financial statements is companies do not necessary to pay income tax. This 
study focuses on manufacturing companies, because this sector mostly implements an 
aggressive tax reporting by reporting losses in their financial statements, yet these 
losses are unrecognized for fiscal purposes (Directorate General of Taxes, 2013). 
This study aims to, first, to examine the simultaneous (reciprocal) influence 
between financial reporting aggressiveness on tax reporting aggressiveness. Second, to 
analyze the impact of financial reporting aggressiveness (which has been influenced 
by the level of tax reporting aggressiveness) on the earnings informativeness. Third, to 
analyze the impact of tax reporting aggressiveness (which has been affected by the 
level of financial reporting aggressiveness) on the earnings informativeness. 
This study has several notable contributions, firstly, this study is the first that 
investigates the simultaneous effect between financial reporting aggressiveness and 
tax reporting aggressiveness, and analyze its impact on the earnings informativeness in 
Indonesia context. Secondly, the findings of this study are also expected to enrich the 
development of science, specifically by providing empirical evidence that there is a 
simultaneous influence between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting 
aggressiveness, as well as its impact on the earnings informativeness. Thirdly, this 
study is expected to provide information to regulators, both accounting standard and 
tax rules setter that the selection of various accounting policies can have an impact on 
the intensity of tax reporting aggressiveness, and vice versa. Fourthly, for public 
companies, especially manufacturing, the results of this study can provide impact 
information if managers conduct aggressiveness of financial statements on tax reports 
as well as information on earnings. Finally, investors, the results of this study can be 
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used as an illustration of how companies conduct financial and tax reporting and are 
more careful in capturing information contained in earnings as decision making. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Agency Theory 
Agency theory is an agreement between the two parties between the agent and 
principal where the agent is in charge of decision making in the company's operations 
(Amanda and Febrianti, 2015). Agency theory has two relationships, namely, between 
the agent and principal, where each party wants to achieve profits in different ways, 
then there will be a separation of interests in which the principal surrenders all 
responsibilities and policies to the agent. However, due to differences in information 
or agents can obtain more information (asymmetry information), the agent acts 
according to his desire to maximize his own profits without being reported to the 
principal. Following what was stated by Kamila and Martani (2014) that in practice 
managers actually do not report financial reports that are following the conditions of 
the company and do data manipulation aimed at attracting investors by doing earnings 
management and tax planning. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggested that in agency theory there is a contract 
between the agent and the principal. The separation of interests arises agency conflicts 
ranging from the low to the complex and caused by the principal's limitations which 
include: 1. Moral hazard is an agreement that has been agreed by both parties between 
the agent and the principal, but not by the agent. 2. Adverse selection is a situation 
where all information obtained from the agent is addressed to the principal purely 
from negligence or intentional error, which aims to maintain the company's reputation 
and investor confidence. 
 
2.2. Signaling Theory  
The signal theory emphasizes the importance of information conveyed by 
companies that aim at investment decisions by external parties. The type of 
information conveyed by the company can be a good signal that is received by 
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external parties, especially investors in the form of earnings announcements from 
listed companies (Anggraeni, 2015). The signal theory states incredible and 
responsible information disclosure carried out by the entity as a sign of the success of 
the efforts made (Rahman et al., 2014). 
According to Brigham and Hauston (2001, 36), the signal is the company's efforts 
to give a signal or instructions to investors about how management sees the company's 
prospects. The signal that is made by management is in the form of information about 
the actions that have been taken to realize or realize the wishes of the owner. 
Information conveyed by management on the basis of specific objectives is to 
influence investors in making investment decisions. For investors and business people, 
information is useful for presenting information, notes and descriptions of the 
condition of the company both in the past, present, or future to benefit the company's 
survival and its impact on the company. 
Signal theory helps reduce the existence of asymmetrical information between 
management, investors and outside parties with the disclosure of quality and 
integrated financial reporting — efforts made by companies to convey information 
where outsiders cannot observe directly. The reduced information gap can improve 
performance and image for the company (Connely et al., 2011). 
Signal theory can be in the form of information about profitability (ROA or the 
level of profit earned on assets that have been used), the higher ROA, the better signal 
shown to investors because ROA reflects the company's performance. A good signal 
can attract investors to invest their funds in stocks or securities. The increase in stock 
demand is followed by stock prices which also increase (Feri, 2014). Increased debt 
can also reflect that the company is considered capable of paying off its obligations 
and is confident about the company's prospects in the future, so an increase in 
profitability and debt can provide a positive signal response for investors and increase 
the value of the company (Mai, 2013). 
2.3 Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
Financial statements are obligations that must be issued by the company as a 
public entity regularly which aims to inform stakeholders about the components of 
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financial statements, one of which is profit, from profit can assess the performance of 
the company either now or in the future (Ujiyantho and Pramuka, 2007). The 
importance of profit for stakeholders encourages management to conduct earnings 
management to attract users of financial statements. Scott (2009) states that the reason 
companies report high profits is due to bonus rewards, political motivation, long-term 
debt agreements, company reputation, attracting investors, initial public offering 
(IPO), and CEO turnover. These reasons motivate companies to manipulate profits by 
reducing or increasing profits following company goals. 
Activities to increase profits according to or not in accordance with accounting 
principles utilizing earnings management are called financial reporting aggressiveness 
(Frank et. Al., 2009). Healy and Wahlen (1999) say if financial statements are no 
longer objective or there is a manager's intervention by using their opinion to change 
the numbers in the actual financial statements to influence the users of financial 
statements it is called earnings management. Fischer and Rosenzweig, (1995) say that 
the existence of earnings management when managers report current profits but do not 
report profitability in the long term. 
 
2.4  Tax Reporting Aggressiveness 
The primary objective of aggressive tax is to reduce the tax burden paid. Tax 
expense is obtained from the results of multiplying taxable income with the tax rate 
set. Whereas taxable income is profit from the company reduced by tax correction or 
referred to as book-tax difference. Techniques carried out in aggressive taxes by 
regulating book-tax difference. According to Chen et al. (2010), there are three 
advantages of tax aggressiveness, namely the first, the tax burden of the company 
becomes smaller, the second is the bonus obtained by managers from shareholders, 
and the third is the opportunity to do rent extraction. But behind the benefits, some 
losses must be received such as sanctions from the tax authority if it is proven to do 
tax evasion, the decline in the value of the company that has an impact on reputation 
and investor confidence. This also affects the fall in stock prices if investors know the 
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company is conducting tax aggressiveness to trick investors (Hanlon and Slemrod, 
2009). 
 
2.5  The Earnings Informativeness (ERC) 
Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) is the extent to which market capabilities 
(sensitivity of stock returns) respond to reported earnings. Earnings informativeness 
can also be interpreted as how much investors capture information contained in 
profits. Whereas according to Cho and Jung (1991), ERC is the impact of unexpected 
returns on stock returns. ERC is the earnings response coefficient to determine the 
extent of abnormal returns in securities to respond to unexpected earnings. In other 
words, ERC aims to predict the effect of changes in stock prices with changes in 
accounting earnings (Scott, 2015). 
The difference in market response is influenced by several things which include 
the earnings informativeness, beta, the company's capital structure, earnings quality, 
growth opportunities and informativeness of price. Scott also said that the level of 
informativeness of stock prices affects the content of accounting earnings information. 
The higher the informativeness of stock prices, the earnings informativeness will 
increase. So that the ERC is decreasing, the stock price information is decreasing. 
ERC is used by investors as fundamental analysis to predict the strength of 
market reactions reflected in corporate earnings information. So, the higher the ERC, 
the market reaction in responding to earnings information is higher and vice versa. 
ERC is considered to have value relevance in measuring earnings information, and the 
information is said to be relevant if it can reflect information needed by investors in 
assessing the company. 
 
2.6.  Development of Hypotheses  
Simultaneous Effect between Financial Reporting Aggressiveness on Tax Reporting 
Aggressiveness 
Following agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), managers are required to 
maximize shareholder wealth, and one way is for managers to select various 
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accounting policies whose purpose is to produce a high-profit report, that is to do tax 
reporting aggressiveness. The selection of income increasing accounting policies is not 
liked by managers, because it will result in increasing corporate income tax. This 
makes managers offset financial reporting aggressiveness activities with tax planning 
activities. 
Frank et al. (2009) found that tax reporting aggressiveness affected the financial 
reporting aggressiveness. On the reverse side, Kamila (2014) found that financial 
reporting aggressiveness can affect corporate tax reporting. From these theoretical 
studies and empirical evidence, the hypotheses 1a and 1b of this study aimed to 
examine the simultaneous influence (reciprocal influence) between financial reporting 
aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness. 
 
H1a: Financial reporting aggressiveness has a positive effect on tax reporting 
aggressiveness. 
H1b: Tax reporting aggressiveness has a positive effect on financial reporting 
aggressiveness. 
 
The Impact of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness and Reporting Aggressiveness 
(Which Has Affected Each Other) on the Earnings Informativeness 
 
Shareholders assess the investment prospects that have been done before; one of 
them is through the statement of financial position and company performance report 
contained in the statement of comprehensive income. When a manager performs a 
discretion in the form of financial reporting aggressiveness, the information content of 
the earnings cannot reflect the actual condition of the company. Empirical evidence 
states that the aggressiveness of financial statements can reduce earnings information 
power (Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). Furthermore, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) found 
that LBTD (accounting profit is higher than fiscal profit) proved to reduce investor 
expectations of the quality of corporate earnings. One proxy for earnings quality is 
earnings informational power (Dechow et al., 2010). Through the company's reported 
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profits, stakeholders can evaluate and predict events in the past, present and future 
(Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). 
Other empirical evidence by Hanlon et al. (2008) is financial statements prepared 
with accounting standards that are more following tax rules (book-tax conformity) 
proven to reduce earnings informativeness reported to shareholders. For shareholders, 
financial statements that better reflect tax rules are not relevant for investment 
decision making. In line with Hanlon, Atwood (2010) found that increasing higher 
book-tax conformity had an impact on the decline in the relationship between 
accounting earnings reported with future cash flows. Besides that, the evidence 
obtained by Alim (2009), that is if the company carries out earnings management by 
reducing accounting earnings (income-decreasing earnings management) makes the 
earnings informativeness decrease. 
Some of the empirical evidence indicates that earnings reports according to 
accounting and according to tax can affect earnings information power, so the 
hypotheses 2a and 2b of this study are as follows: 
 
H2a: Financial reporting aggressiveness that has been influenced by the level of tax 
reporting aggressiveness hurts earnings informativeness. 
H2b: Tax reporting aggressiveness that has been influenced by the level of financial 
reporting aggressiveness hurts earnings informativeness. 
3 Research Method 
3.1. Data and Samples 
This study uses a quantitative approach with non-probability purposive sampling 
method. Sample selection criteria are (1) manufacturing companies that publish 
financial statements continuously in 2013-2016, (2) manufacturing companies that use 
the Rupiah in their financial statements, (3) Available stock price information from 
2013-2016. This study uses secondary data with documentation of data collection 
methods. Secondary data used are financial statements, annual reports and other data 
related to manufacturing companies in 2013-2016. 
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3.2.  Operational Definition and Variable Measurement Financial reporting 
aggressiveness (DFIN) 
Financial reporting aggressiveness is the act of managers to conduct earnings 
management in the preparation of financial statements whether permitted or not 
permitted by applicable accounting principles (Frank et al., 2009). In this study using 
corporate discretionary accruals (DFIN) as a proxy measure for financial reporting 
aggressiveness (Kothari et al., 2005). In financial reporting aggressiveness reflected in 
earnings management. Earnings management is done by discretion aimed at choosing 
the accounting method to be used. The accounting method that will be used in this 
research is the accrual method. First, we use equations (1) from modified Jones (Jones, 
1991) as follows: 
 
TACCit =  α0 +  α1(∆REVit − ∆ARit) +  α2PPEit + εit….….(1) 
Where: 
TACCit = Company accrual total i in year t, namely the difference in profits before 
extraordinary items and operations that are terminated with cash flows from operations 
divided by total assets 
REVit = Changes in income are divided by the total assets of the company i year t 
with t-1 
ARit = Changes in accounts receivable are divided by the total assets of the 
company i year t with t-1 
PPEit = The gross value of fixed assets is divided by the total assets of the company 
i in year t 
εit = discretionary accruals (DFIN) company i in year t 
 
Tax reporting aggressiveness (DTAX) 
Tax reporting aggressiveness is a tax management action to manipulate 
taxable income both following tax regulations or classified as tax evasion. This study 
uses the company's discretionary permanent difference (DTAX) to measure tax 
reporting aggressiveness. This study uses the residue (ε) of equation (2) as an estimate 
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of the difference in permanent discretion that adopts the Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
models: 
PERMDIFFit = α0 + α1INTANGit + α2UNCONit + α3MIit + α5∆NOLit
+ α6LAGPERMit + εit 
Where: 
PERMDIFFit = The total difference in commercial profit and fiscal profit minus 
temporary differences divided by the total assets of the company i in 
year t 
INTANGit = Goodwill and other intangible assets are divided by the total assets 
of the company i in year t 
UNCONit = Profit (loss) reported by the equity method divided by the total 
assets of the company i in year t 
MIit = The profit (loss) borne by the minority is divided by the total assets 
of the company i in year t 
∆NOLit = Changes to net operating losses that can be compensated are divided 
by the total assets of the company i year t with t-1 
LAGPERMit = Lagged value of permanent different divided by total assets of 
company i in year t 
εit  = discretionary permanent difference (DTAX) company i in year t 
DTAX has several advantages compared to other models, which exclude 
temporary differences that can reflect earnings management activities and controls for 
non-discretionary sources of permanent BTD. 
 
Earnings Response Coefficient  
Earnings Response Coefficient is the ability to what extent the market response to 
the reported earnings of the company (Bushman et al., 2004). To find out the change 
in earnings informativeness can be measured by the slope of the earnings coefficient in 
the annual return regression and annual profit changes from equation 3 (Arieftiara and 
Yanthi, 2017). The ERC model that adopts the Hanlon et al. model. (2008) as a proxy 
for earnings informativeness are as follows: 
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Rit = α + β∆Eit + ε………….(3) 
Where: 
The ERC model consists of: 
Stock returns 
Stock return is the difference in the ratio of stock prices over the year including 
the stock price at the end of the previous year (t-1) to the stock price at the end of the 
current tax year (t). So, the market response to earnings reports is after the company 
reports its financial statements. The stock return formula is as follows: 
Rit =  
Pt−P(t−1)
P(t−1)
……………(4) 
Where: 
Rit  = Stock return 
Pt   = Share price at the end of the tax year t 
P(t−1)  = Share price at the end of tax year t-1 
 
Earnings Response Coefficient  
The coefficient (𝛽) of regression changes in previous and current year's earnings on 
stock returns. The coefficients of this regression show earnings response coefficient. 
Empirical Model 
In this study, there are four hypotheses and use the two-stage least square (TSLS) 
regression, model. The TSLS method aims to test two independent variables 
simultaneously (Arieftiara et al., 2017). The independent variables in this study also 
have an influence on the dependent variable (endogenous) according to the estimation 
of the TSLS method (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
 
Empirical Model of the Effect of Simultaneous Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
and Tax reporting aggressiveness. 
Simultaneous influences (hypotheses 1a and 1b) will be tested using Models 5 
and 6. These models 5 and 6 are the first stage of the TSLS Method, from the first 
stage the fitted value will be fitted for each dependent variable. 
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Hypothesis 1a of this study aims to determine the effect of financial reporting 
aggressiveness on tax reporting aggressiveness based on research by Frank et al. 
(2009) will be tested using the empirical model of the study as follows: 
DTAXit = α0 + α1DFINit + α2PTROAit + α3LEVit + α4LCF_Dit + α5SIZEit + εit….. 
(5) 
Where: 
DTAXit = discretionary permanent differences of the company i in year t 
DFINit  = discretionary accruals of the company i in year t 
PTROAit  = The ratio of income before tax to total assets of company i in year t 
LEVit  = Total debt ratio to total assets of company i in year t 
LCF_Dit  = The dummy variable is the existence of loss carry forward of 
company i in year t 
SIZEit = Natural logarithms of total assets of company i in year t 
εit   = Error 
To test the opposite effect (simultaneous influence), i.e., hypothesis 1b which 
aims to determine the effect of tax reporting aggressiveness on financial reporting 
aggressiveness, then using the Frank et al. (2009) research model as follows: 
DFINit =  γ0 + γ1DTAXit + γ2PTROAit + γ3LEVit + γ4LCF_Dit + γ5SIZEit + εit….. 
(6) 
Description of variables such as variable description in Model 5 above. 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b are accepted if the coefficient values are positive and 
significant. If so, then it is evident that financial reporting aggressiveness and tax 
reporting aggressiveness influence each other, or have simultaneous influence. 
 
Empirical Model of the Effect of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness (which has been 
influenced by the Tax Reporting Aggressiveness) on the Earnings Informativeness. 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b aim to test the simultaneous influence between financial 
reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness on the information power of 
earnings. Models 7 and 8 are used to test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, which is the second 
stage of TSLS. 
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Hypothesis 2a aims to prove the impact of financial reporting aggressiveness that 
has been influenced by the level of tax reporting aggressiveness on earnings 
information power, tested using Model 7. The dependent variable predictive value 
(DFIN) in Model 6 (TSLS first stage) will be used as an independent variable in 
Model 7 of the following: 
Rit = σ0 + σ1∆Eit + σ2∆Eit ∗ fvDFIN + σ3CtrlVar + εit…..(7) 
Where: 
Rit  = Stock return 
∆Eit  = Change in previous year's earnings with the current year divided by total 
assets  
fvDFIN= Predicted the value of DFIN (fitted value of DFIN as a result of regression 
models (6) 
εit  = Error 
In Model (7) above 𝜎1  is the earnings response coefficient (ERC) without any 
influence from financial reporting aggressiveness, while 𝜎2  earnings response 
coefficient has been influenced by the predictive value of financial reporting 
aggressiveness (fitted value DFIN). It is expected that the value  𝜎2 is negative and 
significant, which means Hypothesis 2a is accepted.  
Empirical Model of the Effect of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness (which has been 
influenced by the Tax Reporting Aggressiveness) on the Earnings Informativeness 
The final hypothesis, Hypothesis 2b, aims to examine the impact of tax 
reporting aggressiveness that has been influenced by the level of financial reporting 
aggressiveness, on the earnings informativeness using Model 8. Like Model 7, Model 
8 is the second stage of the TSLS estimation method, using predictive value DTAX 
dependent variable from Model 5 as an independent variable fvDTAX in Model 8 as 
follows: 
Rit = β0 + β1∆Eit + β2∆Eit ∗ fvDTAX + β3CtrlVar + εit….. (8) 
Where: 
fvDTAX = Predicted value of DTAX (fitted value of DTAX as a result of regression 
model (5) 
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Other variable information sees the variable description in Model 7. 
In the Model (8) above 𝛽1 is earnings response coefficient (ERC) without being 
influenced by tax reporting aggressiveness (DTAX), while  𝛽2 is earnings response 
coefficient has been influenced by the predictive value of tax reporting aggressiveness 
(fitted value DTAX). It is expected that the value 𝛽2 is negative and significant, which 
means Hypothesis 2b is accepted. 
 
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics of Sample Data 
The number of samples available, namely manufacturing companies listed on the 
IDX in 2013-2016 is 560 firm-years, but as many as 64 firm-years does not have 
complete financial reports, 108 firm-years use currencies other than Rupiah in 
financial statements, and as many as 31 firm-years does not have stock return data. 
The number of final samples used is 357 firm-years. This research data is classified as 
an unbalanced panel because not all companies have the same observation year. Some 
variables have outlier data but have been treated using the winsorizing technique, 
which is 3 times the standard deviation of the average of each variable (Arieftiara and 
Yanthi, 2017). 
All variables have been tested for classical assumptions, namely multicollinearity 
and heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation tests are not carried out considering the type of 
research data is not classified as time series but rather a data panel. The classic 
assumption test results show that all variables do not have multicollinearity because all 
variables have VIF <10. For heteroscedasticity, the results show heteroscedasticity in 
the main model of the study (Models 5, 6, 7, and 8). Therefore, TSLS regression 
testing uses an estimation method that has a robust error variant (Adkins and Hill, 
2008, 194). 
Table 1 is a descriptive statistic for all research data. From Table 1 it can be seen 
that the average manufacturing company has a stock return of 9%. Financial reporting 
aggressiveness and tax reporting show negative averages consistent with their 
respective predictive values. 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive statistics 
Variabel Mean Max Min St.Deviasi Skewness 
DFIN -1.19e-09 2.6739 -3.2133 .0.4634 -0.5009 
DTAX -5.20e-12 3.6101 -3.0873 0.3454 1.5749 
Return 0.0911 2.1325 -0.9342 0.5377 1.7734 
  ∆𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 0.0087 1.9669 -1.8861 0.3209 2.3179 
fvDFIN -0.0013 1.3025 -1.3773 0.2577 -0.6204 
fvDTAX -0.0005 0.8631 -0.8929 0.1562 0.1526 
PTROA 0.0765 1.134 -0.5505 -0.1457 1.9645 
LEV 0.1036 0.468 -0.0828 0.0889 1.6917 
LCF_D 0.2017 1 0 0.4018 1.4869 
SIZE 6.1508 7.9629 0.1149 -2.9743 1.4869 
Where: 
𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡= discretionary permanent differences of the company i in year t; 𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡= 
discretionary accruals of the company i in year t; 𝑅𝑖𝑡 = Stock return; 𝛥𝐸𝑖𝑡= Change in previous 
year's earnings with the current year divided by total assets; 𝑓𝑣𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑖𝑡= Predicted value of 
DFIN (fitted value of DFIN as a result of regression models (6); 𝑓𝑣𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑡 = Predicted value 
of DTAX (fitted value of DTAX as a result of regression model (5); 𝑃𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡  = The ratio of 
income before tax to total assets of company i in year t; 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  = Total debt ratio to total assets 
of company i in year t; 𝐿𝐶𝐹_𝐷𝑖𝑡: = The dummy variable is the existence of loss carry forward 
of company i in year t; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡:= Natural logarithms of total assets of company i in year t. 
 
Univariate Test Results 
Univariate testing is done to predict the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables as an initial prediction of the results of the hypothesis. 
Univariate test results (complete Spearman correlation test can be seen in Appendix 1. 
From the univariate test results all the first stage TSLS model variables (Models 5 and 
6) show that between DFIN and DTAX have a positive and significant correlation, 
while the univariate test results for all the second stage TSLS Model variables 
(Models 7 and 8) show that the relationship between ΔE and return is positive but not 
significant, the relationship between Δ𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑓𝑣𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋 is negative but not significant, 
and the relationship between Δ𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑓𝑣𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 is positive but not significant as well. 
Large shows that the relationship between the dependent and independent variables of 
this study is suitable and not following the hypothesis. The results of this Spearman 
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correlation test in broad outline show that the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables of this study is suitable and not in accordance with the 
hypothesis. 
 
4.2.  Hypothesis Test Results 
Hypothesis Test Results 1a and 1b (Testing of Simultaneous Influence) 
Summary of the results of testing the simultaneous influence between financial 
reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness or testing Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b can be seen in Table 2 (TSLS test results of Models 5 and 6). 
Testing of Model 5 and 6 of this study uses a common effect. This selection is 
following the results of the Chow Test and Hausman Test, and the test is done 
considering the research data is a panel data structure (unbalanced). From Table 2 it is 
known that both models have a significant F probability; this means that the 
arrangement of the independent variables in both Models 5 and 6 can explain well the 
dependent variable. The determination coefficient of R Square in Model 5 is 0.2024 
and Model 6 is 0.3062. This means that Models 5 and 6 meet the goodness of fit 
requirements. 
Table 2 it is known that in Model 5, the DFIN coefficient results show a positive 
and significant value (at level 1%); this means that Hypothesis 1a is accepted. In 
Model 6, the results of the DTAX coefficient also show positive and significant values 
(at the level of 1%); this means that Hypothesis 1b of this study is accepted. These 
results indicate that financial reporting aggressiveness is proven to affect tax reporting 
aggressiveness and vice versa. Thus, it is proven that there is a simultaneous influence 
between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness. 
The results of the control variables are consistent in both models, which are 
positive and significant for the PTROA and SIZE control variables. Both control 
variables are significant at the level of 1% and 10%. The results of other control 
variables, namely LEV and LCF_D showed insignificant results. 
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Table 2. 
TSLS test results of Models 5 and 6 
 
 
 
Summary of TSLS regression test results for models 5 and 6 
 
 
DTAXit = α0 + α1DFINit + α2PTROAit + α3LEVit + α4LCF_Dit + α5SIZEit + εit….. (5) 
DFINit =  γ0 + γ1DTAXit + γ2PTROAit + γ3LEVit + γ4LCF_Dit + γ5SIZEit + εit….. (6) 
Varia
ble 
Sign 
Predic
ted 
Coeffic
ient 
Prob 
t-
statis
tic 
Conc
lusio
n 
Variable Sign 
Predic
ted 
Coeffic
ient 
Prob 
t-
statis
tic 
Concl
usion 
Model 5: DTAX dependent variable Model 6: DFIN dependent variable 
DFIN H1a: + 0.2315 0.000 
*** 
Acce
pted 
DTAX H1b:+ 0.3619 0.000 
*** 
Accep
ted 
PTRO
A 
+ 0.5097 0.000 
*** 
 PTROA + 0.5822 0.000 
*** 
 
LEV + -0.0276 0.000 
*** 
 LEV + 0.5480 0.023 
** 
 
LCF_
D 
+ 0.0849 0.886  LCF_D + 0.0289 0.600  
SIZE + 0.0238 0.053 
* 
 SIZE + 0.1635 0.000 
*** 
 
Consta
nta 
 -0.1986 0.122  Constant
a 
 -1.1109 0.000 
*** 
 
Model Common Effect Model Common Effect 
Hettest Robust Hettest Robust 
Prob>
F 
0.0000 Prob>F 0.0000 
R-
Square 
0.2024 R-Square 0.3062 
N 357 N 357 
Where: 
DTAX= discretionary permanent differences of the company i in year t; DFIN= discretionary 
accruals of the company i in year t; PTROA= The ratio of income before tax to total assets of 
company i in year t; LEV= Total debt ratio to total assets of company i in year t; LCF_D= The 
dummy variable is the existence of loss carry forward of company i in year t; SIZE= Natural 
logarithms of total assets of company i in year t. 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10% 
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Hypothesis 2a and 2b Test Results (Simultaneous Recursive Impact on Earnings 
Response Coefficient) 
Testing of Hypotheses 2a and 2b uses the TSLS regression model 7 and 8. As 
with Models 5 and 6, Model 7 and 8, the Chow Test and Hausman Test are conducted 
first to determine the best estimate of panel data (unbalanced). The results of Models 7 
and 8 better use the estimation of common effects. 
From Table 3 it is known that the arrangement of independent variables in both 
Models 7 and 8 can explain well the dependent variable, this is because both models 
have an F probability that is significant at the level of 1%. Furthermore, both of these 
models have R Square determination coefficients in Models 7, and 8 are 0.0506. Thus, 
Models, 7 and 8 meet the goodness of fit requirements. 
Table 3 shows that in Model 7, the results of the coefficient ΔE*fvDTAX are 
negative but not significant; this means that Hypothesis 2a was rejected. It can also be 
seen in Table 3, that the results of the coefficient ΔE*fvDFIN also show negative 
values but not significant; this means that Hypothesis 2b of this study was rejected. 
These results indicate that tax reporting aggressiveness that has been influenced by 
financial reporting aggressiveness is not proven to reduce the information power of 
earnings. Besides that, the results of this study cannot prove that financial reporting 
aggressiveness that has been influenced by tax reporting aggressiveness can reduce the 
information power of earnings. Thus it is not proven that the simultaneous influence 
between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness can affect 
(decrease) the information power of earnings. 
For the results of the control variables, both LEV and PTROA models show 
consistent results. The LEV coefficient is negative and significant at the 5% level. The 
PTROA coefficient shows a positive value and is significant at the level of 1%. SIZE 
variable shows insignificant results. 
 
 
 
Suharti and Arieftiara 
21 
 
 
Table 3. 
Summary of TSLS regression test results for models 7 and 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rit = σ0 + σ1∆Eit + σ2∆Eit ∗ fvDFIN + σ3CtrlVar + εit…..(7) 
Rit = β0 + β1∆Eit + β2∆Eit ∗ fvDTAX + β3CtrlVar + εit….. (8) 
Variab
le 
Sign 
Predi
cted 
Coeffic
ient 
Prob 
t-
statis
tic 
Conclu
sion 
Variable Sign 
Predict
ed 
Coeffic
ient 
Prob 
t-
statis
tic 
Conclusi
on 
Model 7: R dependent variable Model 8: R dependent variable 
ΔE + -0.1129 0.000 
*** 
Accept
ed 
ΔE H1b:+ 0.3619 0.000 
*** 
Accepted 
Δ𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑓𝑣𝐷𝑇𝐴𝑋 
H2a: 
- 
-0.0267 0.000 
*** 
 Δ𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝑓𝑣𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 
H2b: - 0.5822 0.000 
*** 
 
SIZE + 0.0195 0.000 
*** 
 SIZE + 0.5480 0.023 
** 
 
LEV - 0.9199 0.886  LEV - 0.0289 0.600  
PTRO
A 
+ 0.6459 0.053 
* 
 PTROA + 0.1635 0.000 
*** 
 
Consta
nta 
 -0.1699 0.122  Constant
a 
 -1.1109 0.000 
*** 
 
Model Common Effect Model Common Effect 
Hettest Robust Hettest Robust 
Prob>F 0.0021 Prob>F 0.0039 
R-
Square 
0.0506 R-Square 0.0506 
N 357 N 357 
Where: 
R= Stock return; ΔE= Change in previous year's earnings with current year divided by total assets; 
fvDTAX= Predicted value of DTAX (fitted value of DTAX as a result of regression model (5); 
fvDFIN= Predicted value of DFIN (fitted value of DFIN as a result of regression models (6); 
PTROA= The ratio of income before tax to total assets of company i in year t; LEV= Total debt ratio 
to total assets of company i in year t; LCF_D= The dummy variable is the existence of loss carry 
forward of company i in year t; SIZE= Natural logarithms of total assets of company i in year t 
***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10% 
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4.3. Discussion 
The results of this study prove that there is a simultaneous influence between 
financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness. The results that 
financial reporting aggressiveness affects tax reporting aggressiveness consistent with 
the research of Kamila and Martani (2014). While the results that tax reporting 
aggressiveness affects financial reporting aggressiveness are consistent with the 
research of Frank et al. (2009). The results of this study confirm that earnings 
management activities by managers will always be balanced with tax avoidance 
activities. This is to maintain that increased accounting profit (due to earnings 
management activities) does not cause the company's tax burden to be higher as 
explained by Erickson et al. (2004). On the other hand managers as representatives of 
corporate taxpayers have basic human characteristics that will not be willing to invest 
in the state through the payment of high-income taxes. Therefore managers carry out 
tax avoidance activities by conducting tax reporting aggressiveness (Arieftiara, 2017). 
But this tax avoidance activity is not liked by shareholders because it causes earnings 
reports to be small, this causes managers to balance them with earnings management 
activities. 
The results of this study cannot prove that the simultaneous influence between 
financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness have an impact on 
the earnings response coefficient. There are several explanations related to this. First, 
shareholders do not see that the activities of managers in conducting financial 
reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting aggressiveness as activities that can 
damage the earnings information content. Second, the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC) without being interacted with reporting aggressiveness (both for financial and 
tax purposes) also does not show a significant value, and this means that in the 
company data set in the study sample there is no relationship between stock returns 
and earnings reports. The market is not affected by earnings reports issued by 
manufacturing companies in the period 2013-2016. Third, aggressive financial 
reporting and tax reporting activities for shareholders/investors are not considered as 
information signals that can change investment decisions. Information on the 
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aggressiveness of the report is considered by shareholders/investors as a reasonable 
activity, such as the selection of accounting methods for reporting purposes only, does 
not change the company's financial condition in real terms. This is different from if 
managers are doing other corporate actions as a signal of information that the 
company is making real efforts that can increase the growth of the company.  
 
5 Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
5.1. Conclusion 
The results of the study found three things. First, there is a simultaneous 
(reciprocal) influence between financial reporting aggressiveness on tax reporting 
aggressiveness. Second, the results of the study cannot prove that financial reporting 
aggressiveness (which has been influenced by the level of tax reporting 
aggressiveness) has an impact on the information power of earnings. Third, this study 
also cannot prove that tax reporting aggressiveness (which has been influenced by the 
level of financial reporting aggressiveness) has an impact on the earnings response 
coefficient. 
 
5.2. Implication and Limitation 
The results of this study have several implications, namely: for the development 
of science, the evidence obtained from this study confirms that aggressive financial 
reporting activities by companies will always be balanced with aggressive tax 
reporting activities. The results of this study provide empirical evidence that there is a 
simultaneous influence between financial reporting aggressiveness and tax reporting 
aggressiveness. Implications for regulators, namely accounting standards-making 
bodies should pay attention to regulate in more detail the disclosures related to the 
motivation of managers to choose an accounting policy. For the Director General of 
Taxes, the results of this study imply that as long as the tax rules and accounting rules 
are different, then managers as representatives of taxpayers will always use their 
discretion to do tax planning. For public companies, especially manufacturing, the 
implications of the results of this study can provide information that managers will 
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always take their discretion to regulate profits and the amount of corporate tax burden. 
Although this discretion is not proven to affect the information power of earnings, 
companies still need to keep an eye on the aggressiveness of managers, to prevent 
manager's opportunistic behavior. For shareholders/investors, the results of this study 
imply that shareholders/investors must begin to pay attention to the quality of reported 
earnings so that they avoid mistakes in decision making. Shareholders/investors must 
begin to invest attention to tax awareness or tax compliance as a basis for making 
investment decisions. Such attention will help companies (issuers) to comply with tax 
rules in conducting earnings management and tax avoidance activities, as good 
citizens, investors must still pay attention to information and can be used as an 
illustration of how companies conduct financial and tax reporting and be more careful 
in capturing information contained in profit as decision making. 
This study has limitations, namely assuming that in that period there were no 
changes in accounting policies carried out by the company. This study did not 
consider any changes to the PSAK and the existence of a new policy/policy change by 
the Director General of Taxes in the 2013-2016 period which might have an impact on 
the results of the study. For better results, further research can consider changes in 
accounting policies carried out by companies as control variables. Also, further 
research also needs to add new policies or policy changes issued by the Director 
General of Taxes as a control variable. The addition of this control variable can make 
the research model better at estimating. 
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APPENDIX 
Univariate Test Results 
a. Korelasi Spearman (Model 5 dan 6) 
. spearman DTAX DFIN ptroa lev lcf size, stats (rho p) 
(obs=357) 
 
+----------------- 
|  Key            | 
|-----------------| 
|   rho           | 
|   Sig. level    | 
+-----------------+ 
 
             |     DTAX     DFIN    ptroa      lev      lcf     size 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
        DTAX |   1.0000  
             |  
             | 
        DFIN |   0.1653   1.0000  
             |   0.0017  
             | 
       ptroa |   0.3126   0.2746   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000  
             | 
         lev |   0.0805   0.0740   0.1358   1.0000  
             |   0.1292   0.1630   0.0102  
             | 
         lcf |  -0.0006  -0.0005  -0.3154   0.1559   1.0000  
             |   0.9908   0.9919   0.0000   0.0031  
             | 
        size |   0.1662  -0.1363   0.2114   0.0871  -0.1074   1.0000  
             |   0.0016   0.0099   0.0001   0.1004   0.0426 
 
b. Korelasi Spearman (Model 7 dan 8) 
. spearman return eta ETA_fvDTAX size lev ptroa, stats (rho p) 
(obs=357) 
 
+-----------------+ 
|  Key            | 
|-----------------| 
|   rho           | 
|   Sig. level    | 
+-----------------+ 
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             |   return      eta ETA_fv~X     size      lev    ptroa 
  
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
      return |   1.0000  
             |  
             | 
         eta |   0.0243   1.0000  
             |   0.6477  
             | 
  ETA_fvDTAX |  -0.0096  -0.0169   1.0000  
             |   0.8568   0.7506  
             | 
        size |   0.0823   0.1030  -0.0537   1.0000  
             |   0.1207   0.0519   0.3112  
             | 
         lev |   0.0819   0.0956   0.0015   0.0871   1.0000  
             |   0.1223   0.0712   0.9776   0.1004  
             | 
       ptroa |   0.2569   0.4349  -0.0880   0.2114   0.1358   1.0000  
             |   0.0000   0.0000   0.0969   0.0001   0.0102   
